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Implicit stereotypes and the predictive brain:
cognition and culture in “biased” person perception
Perry Hinton1
ABSTRACT Over the last 30 years there has been growing research into the concept of
implicit stereotypes. Particularly using the Implicit Associations Test, it has been demon-
strated that experimental participants show a response bias in support of a stereotypical
association, such as “young” and “good” (and “old” and “bad”) indicating evidence of an
implicit age stereotype. This has been found even for people who consciously reject the use
of such stereotypes, and seek to be fair in their judgement of other people. This ﬁnding has
been interpreted as a “cognitive bias”, implying an implicit prejudice within the individual.
This article challenges that view: it is argued that implicit stereotypical associations (like any
other implicit associations) have developed through the ordinary working of “the predictive
brain”. The predictive brain is assumed to operate through Bayesian principles, developing
associations through experience of their prevalence in the social world of the perceiver. If the
predictive brain were to sample randomly or comprehensively then stereotypical associations
would not be picked up if they did not represent the state of the world. However, people are
born into culture, and communicate within social networks. Thus, the implicit stereotypical
associations picked up by an individual do not reﬂect a cognitive bias but the associations
prevalent within their culture—evidence of “culture in mind”. Therefore to understand implicit
stereotypes, research should examine more closely the way associations are communicated
within social networks rather than focusing exclusively on an implied cognitive bias of the
individual.
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Traditionally a stereotype has been deﬁned as overgener-alized attributes associated with the members of a socialgroup (such as the reserved English or the geeky engineer),
with the implication that it applies to all group members (Hinton,
2000). A large body of research, particularly in the United States
of America (USA), has focused on the (negative) stereotypes of
women and African Americans, which are linked to prejudice and
discrimination in society (Nelson, 2009, Steele, 2010). Psycholo-
gical researchers have sought to identify why certain people
employed stereotypes and, in much of the twentieth century, they
were viewed as due to a mental fallacy or misconception of a
social group, an individual’s “biased” cognition, resulting from
proposed factors such as “simplicity” of thought (Koenig and
King, 1964) and arising from upbringing and social motivation
(particularly “authoritarianism”, Adorno et al., 1950). A con-
siderable amount of effort has been made subsequently to
persuade people to avoid stereotype use, by highlighting its
inaccuracy and unfairness (for example, Brown, 1965). However,
since the 1960s, cognitive researchers, such as Tajfel (1969), have
argued that stereotyping is a general feature of human social
categorization. Despite this, it has been argued that individuals
can consciously seek to avoid using negative stereotypes and
maintain a non-prejudiced view of others (Devine, 1989;
Schneider, 2004). Indeed, Fiske and Taylor (2013) claim that
now only ten percent of the population (in Western democracies)
employ overt stereotypes. Unfortunately, recent work, speciﬁcally
using techniques such as the Implicit Associations Test
(Greenwald et al., 1998), has shown that stereotypical associations
can implicitly inﬂuence social judgement, even for people who
consciously seek to avoid their use (Lai et al., 2016). These
implicit stereotypes have provoked questions of both the control
of, and an individual’s responsibility for, the implicit effects of
stereotypes that they consciously reject (Krieger and Fiske, 2006).
This article explores the nature of implicit stereotypes by
examining what is meant by “bias” in the psychological literature
on stereotyping, and proposes an explanation of how culture
inﬂuences implicit cognition through the concept of the
“predictive brain” (Clark, 2013). The present work argues that,
rather than viewing implicit stereotypes as a problem of the
cognitive bias of the individual (for example, Fiske and Taylor,
2013), they should be viewed as “culture in mind” inﬂuencing the
cognition of cultural group members. It is also proposed that
combining the research on implicit cognition with an under-
standing of the complex dynamics of culture and communication,
will lead to greater insight into the nature of implicit stereotypes.
Implicit stereotypes
The view of a stereotype as a ﬁxed set of attributes associated with
a social group comes from the seminal experimental psychology
research by Katz and Braly (1933). One hundred students of
Princeton University were asked to select the attributes that they
associated with ten speciﬁc nationalities, ethnic and religious
groups from a list of 84 characteristics. The researchers then
compiled the attributes most commonly associated with each
group. Katz and Braly (1933: 289) referred to these associations as
“a group fallacy attitude”, implying a mistaken belief (or attitude)
on behalf of the participants. The study was repeated in Princeton
by Gilbert (1951) and Karlins et al. (1969), and similar attributes
tended to emerge as the most frequent for the groups. The
endurance of these associations, such as the English as tradition-
loving and conservative, over 35 years has often been narrowly
interpreted as evidence for the ﬁxed nature of stereotypes. Yet, a
closer look at the data shows counter-evidence. Rarely was an
attribute selected by more than half the participants: for the
English only “sportsmanlike” in 1933, and “conservative” in 1969
reached this ﬁgure. Also both the percentages and the chosen
attributes changed over time. By 1969, “sportsmanlike” for the
English had dropped to 22%. A number of attributes in the
initial top ﬁve for some of the groups dropped to below 10% by
1969. Also the stereotypes generally tended to become more
positive over time. However, what the studies did establish was a
methodological approach to stereotypes as the experimental
investigation of “character” attributes associated with social
groups in the mind of an individual.
The notion of implicit stereotypes is built on two key
theoretical concepts: associative networks in semantic (knowl-
edge) memory and automatic activation. Concepts in semantic
memory are assumed to be linked together in terms of an
associative network, with associated concepts having stronger
links, or are closer together, than unrelated concepts (Collins and
Loftus, 1975). Thus “doctor” has a stronger link to “nurse” (or
viewed as closer in the network) than to unrelated concepts, such
as “ship” or “tree”. Related concepts cluster together, such as
hospital, doctor, nurse, patient, ward, orderly, operating theatre,
and so forth, in a local network (Payne and Cameron, 2013) that
is sometimes referred to as a schema (Ghosh and Gilboa, 2014;
see Hinton, 2016). Activation of one concept (such as reading the
word “doctor”) spreads to associated concepts in the network
(such as “nurse”) making them more easily accessible during the
activation period. Evidence for the associative network model
comes from response times in a number of research paradigms,
such as word recognition, lexical decision and priming tasks: for
example, Neely (1977) showed that the word “nurse” was
recognized quicker in a reaction time task following the word
“doctor” than when preceded by a neutral prime (such as a row of
X’s) or an unrelated prime word (such as “table”). Considerable
amount of research has been undertaken on the nature of
semantic association, which reﬂects subjective experience as
well as linguistic similarity, although people appear to organize
their semantic knowledge in similar ways to others. Weakly
associated concepts may be activated by spreading activation
based on thematic association, and the complexity of the
structure of associations develops over time and experience
(De Deyne et al., 2016).
The spreading activation of one concept to another was viewed
as occurring unconsciously or automatically. In the mid-1970s a
distinction was made between two forms of mental processing:
conscious (or controlled) processing and automatic processing
(Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Conscious processing involves
attentional resources and can be employed ﬂexibly and deal with
novelty. However, it requires motivation and takes time to
operate, which can lead to relatively slow serial processing of
information. Automatic processing operates outside of attention,
occurs rapidly and involves parallel processing. However, it tends
to be inﬂexible and (to a high degree) uncontrollable. Kahneman
(2011) refers to these as System 2 and System 1, respectively.
Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) found that detecting a letter among
numbers could be undertaken rapidly and effortlessly, implying
the automatic detection of the categorical differences of letters
and numbers. Detecting items from a group of target letters
among a second group of background letters took time and
concentration, requiring (conscious) attentional processing.
However, novel associations (of certain letters as targets and
other letters as background) could be learnt by extensive practice
as long as the associations were consistent (targets were never
used as background letters). After many thousands of trials,
detection times reduced signiﬁcantly, with the participants
reporting the targets “popping out” from the background letters,
implying that practice had led to automatic activation of the
target letters (based on the new target-background letter
categories). Thus, consistency of experience (practice) can lead
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to new automatically activated learnt associations. However,
when Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) switched the targets and
background letters after thousands of consistent trials, perfor-
mance dropped to well below the initial levels—detection times
were extremely slow requiring conscious attention as participants
struggled with the automatic activation of the old-but-now-
incorrect targets. Slowly, and with additional practice of
thousands of trials, performance gradually improved with the
new conﬁguration of target and background letters. Thus, highly
practiced semantic associations—consistent in a person’s experi-
ence—can become automatically activated on category detection
—but once learnt are extremely difﬁcult to unlearn.
Employing these theoretical ideas, a stereotypical association
(such as “Black” and “aggressiveness”) might be stored in semantic
memory and automatically activated, producing an implicit
stereotype effect. This was demonstrated by Devine (1989). White
participants were asked to generate the features of the Black
stereotype, and also to complete a prejudice questionnaire. Devine
found that both the low- and high-prejudiced individuals knew the
characteristics of the Black stereotype. In the next phase of the
study the participants rated the hostility of a person only referred
to as Donald, described in a 12-sentence paragraph as performing
ambiguously hostile behaviours such as demanding his money
back on something he had just bought in a store. Before the
description, words related to the Black stereotype were rapidly
displayed on the screen but too brieﬂy to be consciously
recognized. This automatic activation of the stereotype was shown
to affect the judgement of Donald’s hostility by both the low- and
high-prejudiced participants. Finally, the participants were asked to
anonymously list their own views of Black people. Low-prejudice
individuals gave more positive statements and more beliefs (such
as “all people are equal”) than traits, whereas high-prejudice
participants listed more negative statements and more traits (such
as “aggressive”).
Devine explained these results by arguing that, during
socialization, members of a culture learn the beliefs existing in
that culture concerning different social groups. Owing to their
frequency of occurrence, stereotypical associations about people
from the stereotyped group become ﬁrmly-established in
memory. Owing to their widespread existence in society, more-
or-less everyone in the culture, even the non-prejudiced
individual, has the implicit stereotypical associations available
in semantic memory. Consequently, the stereotype is automati-
cally activated in the presence of a member of the stereotyped
group, and has the potential to inﬂuence the perceiver’s thought
and behaviour. However, people whose personal beliefs reject
prejudice and discrimination may seek to consciously inhibit the
effect of the stereotype in their thoughts and behaviour.
Unfortunately, as described above, conscious processing requires
the allocation of attentional resources and so the inﬂuence of an
automatically activated stereotype may only be inhibited if the
person is both aware of its potential bias on activation and is
motivated to allocate the time and effort to suppress it and
replace it in their decision-making with an intentional non-
stereotypical judgement. Devine (1989: 15) viewed the process of
asserting conscious control as “the breaking of a bad habit”.
It has been argued that conscious attentional resources are only
employed when necessary, with the perceiver acting as a
“cognitive miser” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991): as a result, Macrae
et al. (1994) argued that stereotypes could be viewed as efﬁcient
processing “tools”, avoiding the need to “expend” valuable
conscious processing resources. Yet, Devine and Monteith
(1999) argued that they can be consciously suppressed when a
non-prejudiced perception is sought. Also an implicit stereotype
is only automatically activated when the group member is
perceived in terms of a particular social meaning (Macrae et al.,
1997) so automatic activation is not guaranteed on presentation
of a group member (Devine and Sharp, 2009). Devine and Sharp
(2009) argued that conscious and automatic activation are not
mutually exclusive but in social perception there is an interplay
between the two processes. Social context can also inﬂuence
automatic activation so that, in the context of “prisoners” there is
a Black stereotype bias (compared with White) but not in the
context of “lawyers” (Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Indeed, Devine
and Sharp (2009) argued that a range of situational factors
and individual differences can affect automatic stereotype
activation, and conscious control can suppress their effects on
social perception. However, Bargh (1999) was less optimistic than
Devine in the ability of individual conscious control to suppress
automatically activated stereotypes, and proposed that the only
way to stop implicit stereotype inﬂuence was “through the
eradication of the cultural stereotype itself” (Bargh (1999: 378).
Rather than the cognitive miser model of cognitive processing,
Bargh proposed the “cognitive monster”, arguing that we do not
have the degree of conscious control, which Devine proposes, to
mitigate the inﬂuence of implicit stereotypes (Bargh and
Williams, 2006; Bargh, 2011).
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) called for the greater use of
indirect measures of implicit cognition to demonstrate the effect
of activation outside of the conscious control of the perceiver.
They were particularly concerned about implicit stereotypes,
arguing that the “automatic operation of stereotypes provides the
basis for implicit stereotyping”, citing research such as that of
Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983). In this latter study, despite
participants scoring low on a direct self-report measure of
prejudice, they still reliably reacted quicker to an association
between “White” and positive attributes, such as “smart”,
compared with the pairing of “Black” with the same positive
attributes. Thus, they concluded that the indirect reaction time
measure was identifying an implicit stereotype effect. Conse-
quently, Greenwald et al. (1998) developed the Implicit Associa-
tion Test (or IAT). This word-association reaction time test
presents pairs of words in a sequence of trials over ﬁve stages,
with each stage examining the reaction time to different
combinations of word pairings. From the results at the different
stages, the reaction time to various word associations can be
examined. For example, the poles of the age concept, “young” and
“old”, can be sequentially paired with “good” and “bad” to see if
the reaction times to the young-good and/or the old-bad pairing
are reliably faster than alternative pairings indicating evidence of
the implicit stereotype of age. As a technique the IAT can be
applied to any word pair combination and as a result can be used
to examine a range of implicit stereotypes, such as “White”
and “Black” for ethnic stereotyping, or “men” and “women” for
gender stereotyping, paired with any words associated with
stereotypical attributes, such as aggression or dependence. The
results have been quite dramatic. The subsequent use of the IAT
has consistently demonstrated implicit stereotyping for a range of
different social categories, particularly gender and ethnicity
(Greenwald et al., 2015). Implicit stereotyping is now viewed as
one aspect of implicit social cognition that is involved in a range
of social judgements (Payne and Gawronski, 2010).
Criticisms of the ﬁndings of the IAT have questioned whether
it is actually identifying a speciﬁc unconscious prejudice,
unrelated to conscious judgement (Oswald et al., 2013) or, as
Devine (1989) suggested, simply knowledge of a cultural
association that may be controllable and inhibited in decision-
making (Payne and Gawronski, 2010). In support of the IAT,
Greenwald et al.’s (2009) meta-analysis of 184 IAT studies
showed that there was predictive validity of the implicit
associations to behavioural outcomes across a range of subject-
areas, and Greenwald et al. (2015) claim this can have signiﬁcant
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societal effects. As a consequence, if implicit stereotyping
indicates a potentially-uncontrollable cognitive bias, the question
then arises as to how to deal with the outcomes of it in decision-
making, particularly for a person genuinely striving for a non-
prejudiced judgement. Overt prejudice has been tackled by a
range of socio-political measures from anti-discrimination laws to
employment interviewer training, but interventions essentially
seek to persuade or compel individuals to consciously act in a
non-prejudiced way. Lai et al. (2016) examined a range of
intervention techniques to reduce implicit racial prejudice, such
as exposure to counter-stereotypical exemplars or priming
multiculturalism, but the conclusions were somewhat pessimistic.
Different interventions had different effects on the implicit
stereotype (as measured by the IAT). For example, a vivid
counter-stereotypical example (which the participants read)—
imagining walking alone at night and being violently assaulted by
a White man and rescued by a Black man—was quite effective.
However, of the nine interventions examined by Lai et al. (2016),
all were effective to some extent but subsequent testing showed
that the beneﬁcial effect disappeared within a day or so. The
authors concluded that, while implicit associations were malleable
in the short term, these (brief) interventions had no long term
effect. This could indicate that implicit stereotypes are ﬁrmly
established and may only be responsive to intensive and long-
term interventions (Devine et al., 2012). Lai et al. (2016) also
suggest that children may be more susceptible to implicit
stereotype change than adults.
The problem is that if people are not consciously able to
change their implicit “bias”, to what extent are they responsible
for actions based on these implicit stereotypes? Law Professor
Krieger (1995) argued that lawmakers and lawyers should take
account of psychological explanations of implicit bias in their
judgements. For example, in a study by Cameron et al. (2010)
participants rated the responsibility of a White employer who
sometimes discriminated against African Americans, despite a
conscious desire to be fair. When this discrimination was
presented as resulting from an unconscious bias, that the
employer was unaware of, then the personal responsibility for
the discrimination was viewed as lower by the participants.
However, being told that the implicit bias was an automatic “gut
feeling” that the employer was aware of, but found difﬁcult to
control, did not produce the same reduction in moral
responsibility. This also has potential legal signiﬁcance (Krieger
and Fiske, 2006), as the law has traditionally assumed that a
discriminatory act is the responsibility of the individual under-
taking that act, with the assumption of an underlying discrimi-
natory motivation (an intention). The effect of an implicit
stereotype bias may be a discriminatory action that the individual
neither intended nor was conscious of.
Implicit stereotype bias provides a challenge to the individual
as the sole source and cause of their thoughts and actions. In a
huge study of over two hundred thousand participants, all citizens
of the USA, Axt et al. (2014) employed the MC-IAT, a variant of
the IAT, to examine implicit bias in the judgement of ethnic,
religious and age groups. Whilst participants showed in-group
favouritism, consistent hierarchies of the social groups emerged
in their response times. For ethnicity, in terms of positivity of
evaluation, Whites were highest, followed by Asians, Blacks and
Hispanics, with the same order obtained from participants from
each of the ethnic groups. For religion, a consistent order of
Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Islam was produced. For the
age study, positive evaluations were associated with youth, with a
consistent order of children, young adults, middle-aged adults,
and old adults, across participants of all ages, from their teens to
their sixties. Axt et al. argued that the consistent implicit
evaluations reﬂect cultural hierarchies of social power (and social
structures) “pervasively embedded in social minds” (Axt et al.,
2014: 1812). They also suggest that these implicit biases might
“not be endorsed and may even be contrary to conscious beliefs
and values” (Axt et al., 2014: 1812). The focus on cognitive bias,
with its implication of an individual’s biased judgement has
tended to ignore the importance of culture in cognition. It is this
issue that is now considered here.
Implicit cognitive “bias”
Implicit stereotypes are referred to in the literature, and taught to
psychology students, as a cognitive bias (Fiske and Taylor, 2013).
When, in the past, only a speciﬁc group of people were assumed
to stereotype (such as authoritarians or the cognitively simple)
then they could be viewed as biased in terms of the liberal views
of the rest of the population. However, as Fiske and Taylor (2013)
claim that now only 10% of the population use overt stereotypes
in liberal Western democracies, the major issue is the implicit
stereotypes that could affect us all. Indeed, some psychologists
(who the reader rightly infers to be supporters of egalitarian
values) are willing to reveal examples of their inadvertent use of
implicit stereotypes in their own lives—to their chagrin (for
example, Stainton Rogers, 2003: 301). Now the assumption is that
implicit stereotypes can affect everyone. This makes the use of the
term cognitive “bias” problematic when it is universally applied,
particularly as it contains the implication of an unconscious
cognitive “failing” of the individual (a “cognitive monster” within
them), especially given the unsuccessful attempts to correct it,
noted above. There also arises the question of how an unbiased
judgement can be deﬁned. This idea of an implicit stereotype as a
cognitive bias is challenged here.
A wheel is said to be biased if it wobbles on an axle (when
others do not). Adjusting it or correcting the imperfections makes
it “true” and it is able to run smoothly and straight on the axle.
Indeed, the word bias derives from the word “oblique” (for a
diagonal thread in weaving) or deviating from the perpendicular.
In human social terms, the idiomatic “straight (or strait) and
narrow” view might be based on “self-evident truths” (to quote
the Declaration of Independence of the USA) rooted in religious
or philosophical beliefs, which essentially provide a position from
which all other views are biased. Yet, unlike “true” wheels and
“fair” coins, there is not an absolute moral standard that is
universally accepted, with a long philosophical debate ranging
from Plato and Kant to Hume about the issue. Different cultures
—as nation states—have different belief systems that are
conventionalised into different national legal systems, with
dynamically changing laws. Despite the United States Constitu-
tion, there are many differences between the views of the
Republican and Democratic Parties and their conservative and
liberal supporters, and there is a constant political interplay
between them about what, in terms of another idiom, is “good
and proper” thinking. Recently, the psychologist Haidt (2012) has
examined the difference between liberals and conservatives in the
USA in terms of their moral foundations. Conventional wisdom
is also about both power and politics and in modern times has
also been challenged (and changed) by social movements, such as
civil rights and women’s liberation. Thus, in human terms a
“biased” view is often one that differs from the agreed position of
a powerful group in a society, with power relations often
considered in the sociology of stereotyping (for example,
Pickering, 2001), but much less so in the cognitive research. In
many cases throughout history, dissenters (such as heretics or
dissidents) have been severely punished, imprisoned and put into
“psychiatric” institutions, for their unconventional “biased” views.
Furthermore, not all implicit stereotypes have the same cultural
value. Consider the associations of “artists” with “creativity” and
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“women” with “dependence”. Both associations are overgener-
alisations and can be labelled as stereotypes. In this sense they are
both cognitive “biases”. Yet there is no large body of
psychological research challenging the stereotype of the creative
artist. This is because the two associations differ signiﬁcantly in
their socio-cultural and political meaning. The latter presents a
representation of women (common in the past) which is no
longer acceptable in a modern liberal democracy where genera-
tions of women have politically fought hard to overcome
discrimination and achieve equality. Not surprisingly, the
majority of the research into stereotyping in the psychological
literature has focused on very speciﬁc topics: ethnicity or race,
gender, sexuality, disability and age. These are all critical issues in
the political debates during the last century in Western societies,
particularly the USA. Conventional views about these social
groups have also undertaken radical change in line with the
greater concerns about reducing discrimination and promoting
equality. As a result the common views (and associated
descriptive terminology) of only a past generation or two are
now socially unacceptable and often illegal. It is not unusual to
hear modern egalitarian adults discuss with horror the racist or
homophobic views they heard at the feet of their grandparents’
generation. These topics continue to be of signiﬁcance in an
ongoing political discussion about anti-discrimination and
equality in modern Western democracies.
Finally, human cognitive abilities have evolved for a purpose,
and implicit associations guiding rapid decision-making have a
survival beneﬁt. Fox (1992) argued that this form of pre-
judgement (rather than culturally based intergroup prejudices)
has evolutionary value. Learning an association of large animals
with danger might be “biased” against harmless large animals
(who we run away from needlessly) but that is a very small cost to
pay compared to a life-saving rapid decision to get out of the way
of a dangerous beast. Indeed, Todd et al. (2012) argued that it is
our ability to make “fast and frugal” strategic (heuristic)
judgements that make humans smart. Making decisions using
simple associations, based on factors such as recognition or
familiarity, may not always result in a logically “correct” answer
but can be highly successful heuristics, as research in topics such
as economics and investment decision-making, emergency
medicine and consumer behaviour have all shown (Gigerenzer
and Gaissmaier, 2011). The model of the person emerging from
the implicit stereotyping research appears to characterise the fair-
minded individual as wrestling with an implicitly biased cognitive
monster within them. However, it is argued here that this is a
false image. We learn the cultural mores of our society through
socialisation and daily communication with other members of the
culture. We may not approve of all aspects of our culture (and
indeed might strongly object to some) but cultural knowledge—
just like other knowledge—is crucial to our pragmatic functioning
in society. The wide range of semantic associations we learn in
our culture can successfully guide our judgements from what to
wear at a job interview, which side of the road to drive on, and
how to talk to the boss. In order to change the speciﬁc set of
implicit associations which we ﬁnd consciously objectionable, it
may be better to explore ways of changing the culture to
undermine these speciﬁc associations, rather than focusing on the
inferred “bias” of human cognition: as is argued from the
“predictive brain” model below, human cognition is functionally
driven to pick up regularities and develop implicit associations
from the world around us.
The predictive brain
It has been proposed that human brains are “prediction
machines” (Clark, 2013: 181), in that experience develops
expectations. Perception operates by employing prior probabil-
ities that are efﬁciently deployed to reduce the processing
requirements of treating each new experience as completely
new. While explored mostly with basic object perception, Clark
(2013) argued that it is applicable to social perception, and Otten
et al. (2017) have applied it to social knowledge. For Clark (2014)
perceiving is predicting. For example, we are able to quickly and
efﬁciently recognize a friend we have arranged to meet outside a
restaurant, even from quite a distance. Through repeated
experience of the friend we have developed a sophisticated
prediction based on a range of cues from their gait to their
favourite coat. Usually, this prediction is correct and it is the
person we expected. The dynamic of the predictive brain is to
minimise the error of the prediction, that is, the difference
between the prediction and the experienced event. Every now and
again we are “surprised”—we mistake a stranger for the friend—
and this instance of “surprisal” (an engineering term for the
error) will also have an incremental effect on the probabilities
(and we might be a little more careful when we next meet the
friend). The brain seeks to minimise “surprisal” by a constant
process of updating probabilities with each experience. However,
an occasional error—as only one instance—will normally only
have a small effect on the prior probabilities that have been
developed over multiple successful perceptions. In this model of
the brain, cognitive bias is not an inaccurate deviation from a
“true” position, but an expectation or prediction based on the
prior probabilities that have developed through experience.
Prediction is not about being correct every time—but is about
minimising error and maximising predictive accuracy. This
process follows Bayes’ Theorem, which expresses a probability
of one event (A) given that another event (B) has occurred (such
as it being the friend, given the familiarity of the coat and
hairstyle observed). This is referred as “likelihood”. Human
perception operating according to Bayesian decision-making has
been studied in both psychology and economics, so the predictive
brain model is also referred to as the “Bayesian brain” (El-Gamal
and Grether, 1995; Bubic et al., 2010). The implicit semantic
associations of “bread” and “butter” or “table” and “chair” (Neely,
1977) have developed through their repeated co-occurrence
during our experience of the world. Clearly in ancient Japan
(without bread and butter or Western-style tables and chairs)
these speciﬁc implicit associations did not develop. In social
perception we can ask: what is the probability of this man being a
basketball player given that he is a tall, Black professional
sportsman? This likelihood is based on prior probabilities—which
come from experience or knowledge of the culture—so the
likelihood could be judged differently by a person from the USA
compared with a person from Kenya.
Allport (1979: 191) proposed that stereotypes were “exagger-
ated beliefs” associated with a social group, citing “all lawyers
are crooked” as an example. The idea that stereotypes involve a
belief that all members of the category share an attribute has
persisted in the cognitive research (Hinton, 2000). However,
Allport (1979: 189) also stated that a stereotype is “a generalized
judgement based on a certain probability that an object of
a class will possess a given attribute”. This is not the same.
The assumption that stereotypes involve “all” judgements
presents them as rigid and ﬁxed, yet the probabilistic association
of a stereotyped group member and a speciﬁc attribute
does not. The presence of an honest lawyer demonstrably proves
the former “all” statement to be an incorrect generalization.
In the latter case, which follows from the predictive brain model,
the experience of an honest lawyer will only adjust the
probabilities according to Bayes’ theorem, making it slightly less
likely that the next (unknown) lawyer will be predicted to be
crooked.
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In a well-known study Kahneman and Tversky (1973: 241)
gave participants a description of Jack that matched the
stereotype of an engineer:
Jack is a 45-year-old man. He is married and has four
children. He is generally conservative, careful, and
ambitious. He shows no interest in political and social
issues and spends most of his free time on his many
hobbies which include home carpentry, sailing and
mathematical puzzles.
They were then asked to predict the probability of Jack actually
being an engineer in a room of 30 engineers and 70 lawyers.
Participants tended to ignore the base-rate probabilities (0.3 for
engineer and 0.7 for lawyer) but made their judgements on the
stereotypicality of the description. Kahneman and Tversky argued
that the participants were making their judgements on the
similarity of the description to the engineer stereotype, which
they called “the representativeness heuristic”, and not on the
base-rate probabilities. They argued that this strategy was not as
good as using the base-rate probabilities as the description may
not be valid and furthermore it could match more of the lawyer
group as there are simply more of them. However, they admitted
that a Bayesian prediction could produce the likelihood of Jack
being an engineer if the description was accurate and diagnostic.
This highlights a key problem of arguing that people’s judgements
are “biased” compared to an “accurate” measurement. Outside
the psychological laboratory people almost never know the base-
rate probabilities (Todd et al., 2012) and learnt associations are
often all they have to go on. In an attempt to ﬁnd accurate
demographic information about engineers, I discovered that 80%
of engineering students in the USA are men (Crawford, 2012)—
which is not diagnostic in this case—but could ﬁnd no data on the
overall proportion of engineers who are uninterested in politics or
enjoy mathematical puzzles. In many cases like this, accurate
demographic data is unavailable, either because it is not there or
because we do not have the time and motivation to ﬁnd it—we
can only rely on our general knowledge of engineers. The
Bayesian brain develops its statistical probabilities from experi-
ence of engineers—such as the engineers encountered in life and
learnt about through the media. The likelihood that an engineer is
a man who is uninterested in politics and likes mathematical
puzzles does not mean that all engineers must have these
attributes, simply that these are frequently encountered in
engineers in the social world, such as the engineer Howard
Wolowitz in the popular US sitcom The Big Bang Theory, 2007.
Thus, the predictive brain, operating through past experience and
subtly adapting to each new experience, is a pragmatically
functional system rather than being “biased” by an all-or-none
overgeneralization.
Consider the following example where I could ﬁnd some
demographic information1. There are 70 professional golfers and
30 professional basketball players in a room (all men and from
the USA). The only available information is that Tom is 193 cm
tall (6′4″). What is the probability that he is a basketball player?
From Kahneman and Tversky (1973), we can infer that a
participant will respond, using the representativeness heuristic,
that Tom is probably a basketball player on the learnt association
that “basketball players are tall”. Using only the base-rate
probabilities Tom should be predicted to be a golfer. However,
a Bayesian analysis of the demographic data agrees with the
representativeness heuristic that it is very likely that Tom is a
basketball player. Rather than assuming that human cognition is
statistically naive, an alternative explanation is that people are
unconsciously Bayesian and they normally assume that a
description identifying learnt implicit associations is accurate
and diagnostic (unless they consciously decide otherwise).
Kahneman (2011: 151) acknowledges the link between height
and basketball players as an example of where representativeness
can lead to a more accurate than chance guess of an athlete’s
sport. Outside of the psychological laboratory it may be that a
limited description is all the information people have to go on.
Indeed, Jussim (2012) argues that when a perceiver has almost no
information about a person except, say, a social category (“This
person is an engineer”) then they may employ stereotypical
associations, based on social knowledge, to make predictions
about them (“Engineers are not interested in politics”), which
may well be accurate. However, in an encounter with the speciﬁc
person, they will learn new information to adjust this view if the
prediction is not supported.
Jussim (2012: 159) argued, in agreement with Kelly (1955), that
people operate as naïve scientists, seeking to make accurate
predictions of people and events based on expectation and, in the
research focus on bias, the evidence that social perception is
generally accurate has been ignored, with various independent
factors often conﬂated in the discussion of stereotype accuracy.
For example, if a perceiver Ben predicts, on the stereotypical
association of a social group and underachievement, that Joe (a
member of the group) will not get into the top university he has
applied for, and Joe is rejected by the university, then Ben’s social
perception is accurate. However, this does not relate to Ben’s
belief about why Joe wasn’t admitted or the actual reason why Joe
was not admitted. Ben could be prejudiced against the social
group (believing the stereotype) but, alternatively, he might be a
fair-minded person who believes that the university is prejudiced
against the group in its procedures. Also the university might
have rejected Ben either as it is prejudiced in its selection or,
alternatively, has a fair-assessment system and Ben is rejected for
reasons unrelated to his group membership. These additional
factors do not mitigate the evidence that Ben’s social judgement
was correct. Jussim (2012: 155) challenged the researchers who
criticize the “permissibility” of relying on stereotypes in
judgement social judgement—arguing for a moral imperative
that stereotypes should not be employed in social judgements—in
their rejection of the accuracy data.
A key point to note here is that the predictive brain operates on
the state of the world as it is experienced and not on the state of
the world as we believe it should be. Working towards gender
equality and encouraging more women into engineering is a key
aim in many Western societies, but that admirable social and
political goal should not lead us to misunderstand the
unconscious working of the predictive brain. Indeed, according
to Crawford’s (2012) ﬁgures, the probabilistic association of
“engineer” and “man” is an accurate reﬂection of the “true” state
of the USA in 2012 where 80% of the recruits to the profession
are men. A second important point is that the Bayesian brain
seeks predictive validity through the picking up of regularities (to
form associations) on the basis of experience. Diversity, or
counter-stereotypical examples (such as encountering a woman
engineer) will reduce the probability of an association (between
“engineer” and “man”), but only to the degree that they are
experienced. Whereas the presence of even a single female
engineer disproves the assertion that “all engineers are men”—
and demonstrates that gender is not a relevant factor in
engineering ability—the presence of only one female engineer
(where all the rest are men) will only have a small effect on the
predictive probability of an engineer being a man. The
implication from the predictive brain model is that when there
are more women engineers, who then become more visible in
everyday life (and in the media) then the implicit stereotypical
association of “engineer” and “man” will change (Weber and
Crocker, 1983).
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The predictive brain, as a perceptual mechanism, is directed
solely by the minimization of surprisal. It does not make a moral
judgement or provide an explanation for the state of the world. It
simply seeks to make accurate predictions. In a study on language
learning, Perfors and Navarro (2014) argued that the Bayesian
brain learns through a process of iterative learning (from other
members of the community). Whereas previous researchers have
argued that it is solely the structure of language that structures the
meanings acquired, Perfors and Navarro (2014) argued that the
structure of the external world (and the meanings within it) will
also inﬂuence the process. We don’t simply learn that an
engineer, by deﬁnition, designs and builds systems but also that,
in the external world, they are mostly men. Thus, semantic
knowledge acquired will be shaped by the meaning structure
communicated. As long as the things people talk about reﬂect the
relationships of those things in the external world then the
semantic relationships learnt will reﬂect the meanings present in
the external world. Thus, knowledge of the relationship between
concepts will be acquired from the meanings communicated by
others. Furthermore, the proposal of a Bayesian brain does not
require that it operates in an optimal (or rational) manner—
simply that a Bayesian model best represents its behaviour
(Tauber et al., 2017). Learning for the Bayesian brain involves
testing predictions (hypotheses) by using the data obtained from
the world and applying Bayes’ theorem to develop probabilities
(Perfors, 2016). For the predictive brain, the degree to which
implicit stereotypes are learnt and employed depends on the
probabilities with which the implicit associations between the
social category and an attribute are expected and experienced in
communication. It is this world of the social perceiver that is
considered now.
Implicit stereotypes and “culture in mind”
Implicit stereotypes, like other implicit associations can be viewed
as cultural knowledge or folk wisdom that the person acquires
through their experience in a culture (Bruner, 1990). The idea
that stereotypical associations are cultural in origin was proposed
in the early work on stereotypes, but has tended to be ignored in
the focus on the fallacy or bias of individual cognition. Journalist
and political commentator Walter Lippmann is usually seen as
stimulating the academic study of stereotyping with his 1922
book Public Opinion (Hinton, 2000). While Lippmann used the
term “stereotype” familiar to him from newspaper printing, he
saw it as a cultural phenomenon: “we tend to perceive that which
has been picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.”
(Lippmann, 1922: 81; my italics) In Lippmann’s view it is the
culture that is creating the stereotype, not the individual (Hinton,
2016). As Allport (1979: 189) pointed out: stereotypes “manifestly
come from somewhere”. To illustrate this, we can examine the
origin of the associations identiﬁed in the Princeton studies,
discussed at the beginning of this article, by considering the
example of the English. As Hinton (2016) has argued, the selected
attributes reﬂect the notion of the English gentleman, a common
representation of the Englishman in the American media of the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, and hence familiar to the
exclusively male, upper-class Princeton student participants who,
if they had encountered English people it is likely that they would
be from the same class demographic as themselves. It is also likely
that these participants did not consider (nor were they asked to
do so) a range of categories of English people, such as women or
the working classes, so, not surprisingly, tended to focus on the
speciﬁc and familiar representation of the English deﬁned for
them by their culture (to paraphrase Lippmann). By 1969, the
image of the English gentleman had become rather archaic and
even a ﬁgure of fun in both the British and American media
(Hinton, 2016) and the selected English attributes had changed.
Also, a crucial point to note is that the student participants were
only asked “to select those [attributes] which seem to you to be
typical” of the group (Katz and Braly, 1933: 282). Even so, some
students refused to do the task in 1951 and 1969 (Brown et al.,
1987), which indicates that, even for the students who had agreed
to take part in the study, there was no evidence that the selected
attributes represented their own personal attitudes, thus the
responses did not reﬂect a fallacy or a cognitive bias of the
participants. To perform the task with no information except the
category name, the students may have simply drawn on attributes
they knew to be commonly circulating about the English in their
culture. The most popular attribute in 1933 for the English was
“sportsmanlike”, and this might even have shown up in the IAT if
it had been available at the time. Yet this does not mean that the
students viewed all English people as sportsmanlike. However, the
sportsmanlike English gentleman was a familiar trope in
American popular culture at the time, typiﬁed by actor Ronald
Colman in Hollywood movies such as The Dark Angel, 1925, and
Bulldog Drummond, 1929. By 1969, “sportsmanlike” had dropped
out of the Princeton top ﬁve attributes for the English (Karlins
et al., 1969). We can take Allport’s example of the “crooked
lawyer” stereotype as a second example. A person with no
personal antipathy to lawyers, and well-aware that they are a
highly regulated profession of mostly honest people, might make
the prediction that when a lawyer character appears in a popular
crime drama that they will (probably) be crooked from the
experience of lawyers in famous movies such as The Godfather
series, 1972–1990, and television programs such as Breaking Bad,
2008–2013, (along with the spin-off series about a crooked
lawyer, Better Call Saul, 2015).
As Devine (1989) has argued, well-learnt associations picked
up during socialization form implicit stereotypes even for the
individual seeking non-prejudiced views. It is argued here that the
predictive brain model provides the mechanism for this. The
process of picking up associations probabilistically is happening
unconsciously through Bayesian principles throughout a person’s
life within a culture. Yet culture is neither monolithic nor ﬁxed
and unchanging. People are active in the construction both of
their social world and their media environment (Livingstone,
2013; Burr, 2015). As Smith (2008: 51) points out “In reality,
people’s social environments are probably best characterized as
social networks. People have links of acquaintanceship, friendship,
etc. to particular other people, which interconnect them in a
complex web”. Within any society, there will be different social
networks of this kind communicating different social representa-
tions about social groups. According to Moscovici (1998), it is
these shared representations that deﬁne a culture or subcultural
group. Different cultural groups will differ ideologically through
their position in society and the representations that circulate in
the communication within their social network. While one
cultural group may be actively promoting one representation
(such as “immigrants” are “a great economic beneﬁt to our
society and add to the diversity of our culture”) through a range
of communications, such as television, newspaper and social
media, another group may be promoting an alternative
representation (such as “immigrants” are “a burden on society,
taking jobs and undermining our culture”). In the communica-
tion within any social network there will be regular and consistent
associations between social groups and attributes, which will be
picked up by it members, through the working of the predictive
brain. The extent to which individuals share implicit associations
will depend on the hegemonic social representations within the
society across cultural groups (Gillespie, 2008), such as a positive
belief in democracy and a negative view of communism, which
are prevalent in the wider social institutions within a nation, and
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examined in the sociological study of stereotypes (for example,
Pickering, 2001).
The role of stereotypes in communication within a social
network was demonstrated by Kashima and colleagues (Kashima
and Yeung, 2010; Kashima et al., 2013) in their research on the
serial retelling of stories. The results showed that stereotype-
consistent information was emphasized. Even though stereotype-
inconsistent information attracted attention it was not necessarily
passed on. Thus, the story became more stereotypical and
consistent in the serial retelling. They argued that “stereotypes
can be thought of a signiﬁcant cultural resources that help us to
transmit cultural information” (Kashima and Yeung, 2010).
Within a social network common understandings are developed
via the use of stereotypes. Members of the culture assume a
knowledge of the stereotype in other group members, which
facilitates social interaction, but potentially also helps to maintain
the stereotype, even in the face of inconsistent information. From
this research, it can be argued that the analysis of implicit
stereotypes should focus on the communication of meaning
within a social network, rather than considering them as a “bias”.
The complex dynamics of the individual within a social network
(for example, Christakis and Fowler, 2009) needs to be considered
in investigating the formation, transmission and maintenance of
implicit stereotypes.
In the modern world of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the options
available for people to construct their social environments have
radically increased (Giddens, 1991). The media has rapidly
expanded through multiple television channels, a proliferation of
media outlets, and the development of social media via the
internet. While this offers the potential for people to engage with
a diversity of representation and counter-stereotypical informa-
tion, it also allows people to remain in an ideological subculture,
communicating with like-minded people where speciﬁc repre-
sentations of cultural others are constantly being circulated
unchallenged within the social network. In terms of the predictive
brain, implicit associations will develop from the consistent
messages people receive in their everyday lives. If certain implicit
stereotypes are deemed unacceptable then it will only be when
people experience consistent counter-stereotypical information
over a long period of time that these associations will be
probabilistically undermined. For this to be achieved, everyday
experience has to involve necessarily (but not sufﬁciently)
exposure to alternative representations and counter-evidence to
these speciﬁc implicit stereotypes, rather than people only
experiencing the consistent representations about social groups
circulating within a particular culture, social network or social
media “bubble”.
Conclusion
Over the last 30 years stereotype research has focused on implicit
stereotypes, particularly using the IAT, which have been
interpreted as revealing an implicit or unconscious cognitive
bias, even for the consciously fair-minded person. Despite
research questioning the predictive validity of the IAT as a
method of revealing unconscious prejudice (for example, Oswald
et al., 2013), the focus of implicit stereotypes has dominated the
psychology of stereotyping in the twenty-ﬁrst century (Fiske and
Taylor, 2013). However, it is argued here that implicit stereotypes,
as attributes associated with social groups, do not indicate an
unconscious cognitive “bias” (a “cognitive monster”) within the
fair-minded person but are learnt associations arising from the
normal working of the predictive brain in everyday life. These
associations are based on information circulating within the
person’s culture, and the associations are probabilistically
detected by the predictive brain: as such they can be characterised
as “culture in mind” rather than an individual bias. According to
the predictive brain model, when the culture changes then the
implicit stereotypes of its members will change (albeit slowly for
some associations). Therefore, to properly understand the nature
of implicit stereotypes, the cognitive research needs to be
combined with the study of the dynamics of culture, to
understand the speciﬁc associations prevalent in the commu-
nication within a culture and their implicit inﬂuence on the
members of that culture.
Notes
1 I worked with the following data. American golfers are of normal height (say, mean of
173 cm or 5 feet and 10 inches), professional basketball players in the USA are tall (say,
a mean of 200 cm of 6 feet 7 inches), assumed standard deviations of 10 cm or 4 inches
for both groups, and heights to be normally distributed.
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